The main object of the present article is a modest one in view of the underresearched nature of the subject -merely to indicate some of the contexts in which volunteering can be better understood. Of these contexts, the most useful work done recently has been on the growth of national consciousness, including the importance of patriotism as a unifying element in political life.4 Precisely how much patriotism expressed the divisions and rivalries of an increasingly complex social structure and how much it superseded them remains unclear, but it no longer suffices to see it simply as a device of the ruling class to dissipate the challenge from below. A great deal of patriotic activity originated from and was controlled by the urban middle classes, who, it is argued, used it to legitimate their concerns and secure their status against an enormously powerful hierarchy. The volunteer movement badly needs to be investigated in this context because its social base was urban and middle class to a degree that has never been appreciated. Probably over threequarters of the corps in the earlier part of the revolutionary war, and over half in the latter part, were town corps. With the great Napoleonic mobilization of I803-4, this proportion fell drastically; but the movement continued to contain a significant urban element. One can emphasize the importance of the towns further by qualifying the aristocracy's contribution; the country corps were often smaller and less efficient, and many were formed only when the government threatened the counties with a compulsory levy in August I803.
Amon-g the ways a developing middle-class identity was expressed was through a growing civic-mindedness and voluntary endeavour. Volunteer corps, important adornments of patriotic occasions, contributed significantly to the building of civic cultures in a period when these were starting to shed their old exclusiveness and becoming more public and self-consciously communal. The corps may also easily be placed in the category of voluntary societies which, as described by R. J. Morris, became increasingly important instruments of class.5 Through the societies the middle class, under the leadership of its elite, asserted its interests within the aristocratic regime, moulded an identity out of its own diverse character and preserved its power and authority in the towns against a subordinate populace. The key point about volunteering was that it armed the middle classes and might have altered profoundly social relations in the urban communities. That it did not was because the corps had a short-lived existence, and because, even while they lasted, the elites in command of them showed no inclination to defend their interests by use of main force.
A huge armed mobilization, with significant urban participation, was equally a threat to the distribution of power at the national level. Volunteers were regarded ambivalently by the state, for while they produced huge additions of armed force, ever more valuable as the military needs of governments expanded, close control of them was elusive. Indeed, the conclusion of the wars against the Napoleonic empire in I 815 saw governments everywhere react against the large-scale arming of the population by downgrading or disbanding the civilian auxiliaries and enhancing the professional army.6 The British volunteers felt the steadily tightening grip of government from the time of the movement's apogee in I803-4. It did not take long before the state acted to be rid of them altogether, establishing in I 809 a local militia which was both more useful for its purposes and more closely under its control. The conundrum of the volunteers, then, is why an armed popular movement, especially one in which the middle classes were strongly represented, faded so quickly. Sociologists of war (and historians) have hypothesized about the democratizing effect of mass mobilization ;7 but in this case an enormous and indispensable military contribution by those highest in power and status outside the ruling class brought no substantial rewards, the aristocratic state calmly winding up the possibility of any political-military challenge. The demise of the volunteers has been said to indicate 'just how volatile and potentially subversive this supposed instrument of loyalist control was perceived to be'. Aristocratic dislike of an armed citizenry cannot be denied; there was a basic incompatibility, which democrats and radicals became fond of pointing out, between the 'armed nation' and the aristocracy's privileged position in the state. 8 Yet in another context, that of the state's military requirements, this view of a popular movement succumbing to a self-interested, manipulating aristocracy is less than clear. When the volunteers were disbanded, it was done in the name of'efficiency' and 'the public service'. Granted, this was the cloak increasingly thrown around aristocratic rule in the late Georgian period in response to the developing pluralism of British society. But it is also true that in matters of national defence the needs of the state were paramount. In one sense volunteering was a wartime improvization which the state could never feel happy with because the independence of the corps impaired its military monopoly. Fundamentally, however, the volunteers were an inadequate response to the great changes taking place in the military systems of Napoleonic Europe as armies were transformed by the 'addition of mass' and as states sought effective protection by organizing themselves as 'armed nations'. After I803 especially, for the rest of the war, Britain maintained huge, mainly civilian-based forces for home defence and struggled con- 6 John Gooch, Armies in Europe (London, I980), pp. 50-5. tinuously to make them serviceable and efficient. The triumph of the volunteer principle was never complete because the state always held the powers of leveeen-masse in reserve and was continually drawn to the idea of enforcing compulsory service. In the end, Castlereagh's local militia provided for universal training, in effect conscription for territorial service. Its introduction makes it difficult to resist the conclusion that, whatever aristocratic opposition existed, the volunteers were superseded as the less efficient organization. Certainly, there is little point in studying any military institution in isolation from the military structure and strategic environment to which it belonged. The state's search for efficiency has an even wider reference in the opposition of civilian values and concerns and military priorities. Volunteering ultimately deserves to be placed in the context of the militarization of British society as mass military organizations developed. It, of course, existed at the beginning of this process; but because it was part of such a formative period of British 'armed nationalism', within the movement the collision between society and the army was particularly sharp. The remoteness of large sections of eighteenth-century society from the armed forces, especially the achieving middle classes, is subject only to the qualification that the navy became an increasingly powerful symbol of national success. Even the aristocracy are now said to have 'returned to Camelot' in the nineteenth century; Britain's small military establishment was a lesser vehicle of social opportunity and power than continental armies were and her elite therefore may well have been strongly attracted in other directions.9 What needs to be emphasized is that previously there had been nothing approaching the great mobilization of the revolutionary and Napoleonic period -in some places equalling over 25 per cent of adult males. Later, in the age of conscription and total war, the tension in the mass army between the attitudes and values brought from civil society and the demands of the military was alleviated by a powerful doctrine of citizenship which included the duties of military service and national defence. Georgian Britain possessed merely an incipient ideology of this kind.
The result, without exaggeration, can be described as a continuous, largely ineffective struggle by the army to 'decivilianize' the volunteers. Late Victorian and Edwardian nationalists, like Fortescue the military historian, recorded the 'indiscipline' and 'amateurism' of the volunteers as sheer perversity; they had no conception of how people could hang back from participation in the armed defence of the state on the state's terms. The rhetoric of the nation-in-arms was loudly heard during the French wars; but pervading volunteering were more compelling influences -sensitivities about communal identities, status differences, 'civil subordination' as opposed to 
II
A key aspect of the attempt to militarize the volunteers was a long-persevering drive against their localism which had the aim of making them an effective part of the army and its plans for national defence. Here the 'lively debate' over whether they perceived themselves primarily as a 'law and order' force intrudes, for this role envisaged them acting in their localities against local manifestations of sedition and discontent. There is, in fact, little to this whole issue. For a start, it needs to be appreciated that, along the exposed coasts, auxiliaries were a time-honoured form of self-defence against enemy raiders and privateers, and were appearing soon after war was declared: over half the corps formed in I793-4 fell into this category.'2 Further, in the Napoleonic war commencing in I803 the volunteers were hardly ever employed as police, the state instead making every effort to incorporate them into the antiinvasion armies. The priority of the state's military needs had been established during the preceding 'counter-revolutionary decade'. Though the corps of the 1790S can be regarded as local mobilizations of the possessing classes and though they often had antecedents in the loyalist associations and stressed in their terms of engagement their police function, they always lacked a purely local focus in that most came into existence at times of threatened invasion when their logical and most useful contribution was to free the regulars and militia for field service against the enemy. Once formed, they displayed no real counter-revolutionary initiative; they were unenthusiastic about acting as police and the authorities were equally reluctant to employ them as such: not one major vigilante action can be ascribed to them. On the other hand, when in 1798 the government moved to include them properly in its counterinvasion strategy by setting them tasks of guard and escort in the rear of the field armies, there was a high rate of compliance, though it overthrew the principle of local service only. Thereafter the state was quite uninhibited in its search for ways of extending the corps' military usefulness.
'Law and order' thus gave the volunteers an initial identity in default of any other, but one rapidly discounted once the state began to take seriously their military possibilities. Some of the armed associations of 1798 -at first thoroughly parochial and civilian-minded -are particularly interesting in 10 But the volunteers' adaptation to national service did not mean they ceased being self-consciously local.
Corps remained firmly anchored in local communities, often resisting strenuously attempts to amalgamate them into larger units based perhaps on a group of parishes or a town and surrounding villages, sometimes on county subdivisions; as late as I803 there were only three English counties where the lieutenancies were able to organize all or nearly all their volunteers in a few battalions.'4 Volunteering is interesting not least because, with the exception of the yeomanry corps, county military activity was no longer monopolized by the county elites. So much depended on initiatives taken lower down. Corps were mostly formed at the level of the parish or town; if local leaders did not help persuade men to enrol, canvass subscribers and offer themselves as officers, little could be accomplished.
The prominence of towns in volunteering especially reinforced its localism. Towns were usually distinctive communities, proud and powerful by virtue of their attachment to national networks and their importance as markets and centres of production and population. Volunteering could make a point about the consequence of a town and its status as an independent community. It was also the sort of activity which suited urban leaders, who tended to have an acute sense of their worth, even in quite small places. These elites could not ignore aristocratic power, which besides dominating government and the countryside often extended long arms into the towns through the possession of urban land and patronage; nor could they deny their subordinate rank in the social hierarchy. But they were perpetually on their guard against allowing this lower status to degrade into subservience. Volunteering had a threefold attraction: it enabled them to act independently of' the county'; it gave them a conspicuous part in public life; it served as a expression of the power they wielded within their own communities. The urban self-consciousness contained in the volunteer movement is easy to see. Less apparent is the degree to which volunteering added to the tensions between urban and county leaderships. The county gentry set the tone of the relationship from the start by allocating the subscription monies raised in I 794 almost exclusively to the yeomanry, the force most closely identified with their county loyalties, rural background and concern for order. Lincolnshire's committee, for example, paid out for nothing but yeomanry, though it raised over /D4,000. In Suffolk by I796 the five yeomanry troops had drawn for /5,736 out of a total defence fund Of /7,500, most of the remainder going on the militia.2" These unofficial 'defence committees' had had their day once the government began closer support of the yeomanry through money grants and legislation. Anyway, an increasing amount of military business was devolving on the county lieutenancies as the organization of home defence became more elaborate. Sometimes the lord-lieutenant acted alone, sometimes through meetings of deputy-lieutenants and J.P.s.27 In either form the lieutenancy was a powerful aristocratic presence in county military affairs. Yet urban volunteers continued to elude close control. The lieutenancy was never able to lay down where corps should be raised, nor their terms of service; nor force amalgamations; nor order corps to go on 'permanent duty'. Chichester and Lewes even objected successfully to the uniform of 'ordinary soldier's cloth' the duke of Richmond sought to impose on all Sussex units.28 The most important power the lieutenancy possessed over the corps was the recommendation of officers for commissions, vital if the crown's military monopoly was to be protected. In practice, however, this authority remained formal rather than effective, especially after i803 when the pressure was on counties to raise a large force of volunteers or submit to compulsory training. The lower commissioned ranks were filled at the commanding officer's nomination. For the higher posts, the lord-lieutenants generally acted on the assumption that those named were worthy because, having raised a corps and perhaps having been elected by the members, they had proved their local consequence. Only in relatively few cases, where volunteering became associated with political contentions, did a lieutenancy find scope to intervene. Yet the town world everywhere intersected with the aristocracy's world; and often the aristocracy's presence in the town was more than simply intrusive. So many towns had aristocratic patrons, this kind of aristocratic influence inevitably played on urban volunteering, with sometimes obviously powerful effect. Hitchin's leading men did not think of choosing a commander from among their number until an offer had been made to Sir Charles Radcliffe.30 Likewise, in I803, the colonelcy of Birmingham's three battalions went to the earl of Dartmouth, whose family had long been prominent in the politics and philanthropy of the town. But what is significant is not that there were aristocratic commanders in the towns but that they were disproportionately few in terms of the aristocracy's urban interests. On the whole, the urban corps were pre-eminently middle-class organizations controlled by business and professional leaders whose political and social consequence rapidly diminished away from their town. Volunteering gave them purchase against the massive weight of aristocratic privilege by putting them well to the fore when it came to a task as vital as the task of national defence.
It sufficient 'gentlemen' to serve as officers, all would be safe. But sufficient 'gentlemen ' were hard to find in the towns, and hard to find everywhere once mobilization became truly extensive. The Devon lieutenancy's 'standing committee' wanted every commander to be vouched for by a deputylieutenant or J.P., which indicates how feeble it felt its own powers of supervision to be.33 A major reason why the local militia of i8o8 rapidly absorbed much of the volunteer strength was that it suited the gentry's predilections so much better. It was a force firmly under the control of the county authorities, financed at public expense, and with a property qualification for officers. Towns and townsmen could be put in their place, while the moral pressure on individual gentlemen to recruit in their localities, accept commands and bear much of the cost themselves largely disappeared.
Usually the local militia is depicted as an administrative achievement, the last and most successful of a series of expedients during the French wars aimed at producing an efficient home defence force of soldier-civilians. While it was this, it was also the aristocracy's triumph over a movement which, in parts, had been significantly independent of their control and presented a tacit military and social challenge. Castlereagh, in contemplating reform of the part-time auxiliaries, was at first disposed to save the urban volunteers because of their efficiency and esprit; but his scheme, in its final form, was deliberately designed to destroy their separate identity and incorporate them into county formations. There was a quite brutal return to the old, pre-war system by which the auxiliaries to support the regular army were all deemed 'militia' and the county recognized as the primary unit of defence organization. Generally, where a volunteer corps transferred its services into the local militia, about one-third to one-half of the members resigned. Officers of town corps were often keen to transfer, provided they could keep their rank; but because not all of their men would follow them and the new battalions were larger units anyway, they invariably found themselves commanding corps which lacked communal identity and were full of young labourers.34 As for the volunteer corps that remained, they were slowly but surely squeezed out of existence by the government's withdrawal of financial support. had wider implications because the volunteer movement recruited urban elites into the country's military system for the first time and was easily the largest military mobilization of urban communities that had ever occurred. From the movement's outset, the state worked ceaselessly to find and perfect the means of control, and by i804 had succeeded to the extent of having a force of civilians trained, organized and committed to joining the anti-invasion armies. This process deserves to be traced. But the two interesting questions that remain are why the state, having promoted volunteering, then chose to destroy it, and why such a formidable popular movement succumbed so easily.
III
The original role of the volunteers was purely static defence. They were to strengthen the coastal defences at vulnerable points by offering some degree of protection against sudden raids or initial resistance to any serious landing attempt. The volunteers specifically asked for in I 794 were infantry to guard and help work the coastal batteries which were crucial for denying the enemy access to harbours and beaches. The main problem about the armed nation was making it into a national army. As the lord-lieutenants had to be told in I798, the multiplication of corps for 'local defence and security' would eventually 'diminish the means which might otherwise be appropriated to the greater object of national Defence against Foreign Invasion'. 41 Over the remaining years of the revolutionary war the military did not seriously prepare the volunteers for field service or they would have tried to do away with the vast number of small corps, often as small as a single company or troop. On the other hand, the volunteers themselves rapidly adopted the 'object of national defence'. By Much the harder part was to erect a command structure which would have reduced the disjointedness of the volunteer force, and, by doing so, made it properly employable. From the army's point of view, it always remained maddeningly incohesive, at best only partially integrated into the country's military system. Volunteer brigades existed merely on paper, but even this could not conceal their heterogeneous character -numerous corps of varying size and discipline -which made them too unwieldy ever to be effectively commanded.It proved impossible to eliminate the bad effects of volunteer localism. Corps often resisted amalgamation stoutly, led by officers anxious to protect their independent commands if they could not achieve higher rank. When corps did unite, they were capable of keeping their own committees and subscription monies, even of continuing to choose their officers.48 Neither did mergers necessarily work well. The larger a corps, the more dispersed its members could be, which meant the drilling of the whole could be infrequent and the drilling of detachments uneven. Local jealousies could also fester. The Sutton company of the Ely United Volunteers was never manageable by the Ely commanders, and, after one particular instance of disobedience involving an officer, it had to be disbanded.49 46 The law was precise on the point that volunteers were not under army orders nor subject to army discipline until called out by proclamation. As civilian bodies, ultimately they trained as they liked, under rules agreed by the corps but effectively enforced by the personal authority of the officers. The most the army could do to resolve the contradictions between civilian status and military service was to make known its requirements. Permanent duty was especially useful because it placed the corps under army command and accustomed them to acting under the articles of war. Otherwise the army had to fall back on exhortation about the importance of 'proper discipline', on its powers of inspection and on familiarization visits by the generals who were to command the volunteers in action.
Probably the amount of inefficiency surprised no one; it was an inescapable consequence of local organization and civilian status. But once the whole volunteer structure came to be regarded as suspect, as happened very quickly after I8o6, the government saw an opportunity to carry through a 'root and branch' reform of the auxiliaries in which, for the most part, the disadvantages of the volunteer system could be eliminated. With the local militia, what had been the most practicable way of creating the huge anti-invasion armies needed in I803, but what could never be made efficient, was destroyed in favour of a force which rested on opposite principles of compulsory service, public funding, central control through the county governments and subordination to military authority -the last was achieved by requiring each battalion to embody for twenty-eight days' training a year under army discipline, the 'permanent duty' which perhaps three-quarters of the volunteer corps had succeeded in avoiding.52 The development of Napoleonic warfare brought home the fact that the nation needed a fully integrated system of home defence in which mass armies comprising large numbers of civilian auxiliaries would be ready to take the field. By their very nature, the volunteers were always less than satisfactory materials for such a strategic system. In the even broader context of Britain's total war effort, they were too 50 Circular letter to lord-lieutenants, 30 separate from the army to assist the flow of men into the army. As the scale of warfare increased, and as the country's confidence in its resources improved, volunteering was seen to be cheap without being efficient and restrictive where the army's recruitment was concerned. Windham and Castlereagh, as successive secretaries for war, had similar basic intentions in spite of their political differences. Both were ready to confine volunteering to the large towns where it was most efficient, and both aimed to increase the reserve of trained men by compulsion with an eye on how this would operate to the army's advantage. There were, even so, powerful interests represented in the movement, especially the urban elites whose corps were the last to be regarded as irrelevant, patriotically or militarily. Windham aroused their fury with his proposal to deprive them of government allowances. Castlereagh, in contrast, ran into little difficulty and successfully converted numbers of them into local militia battalions. Powerful the volunteer interest may have been, but in little over a year it was a spent force, capitulating tamely to the state's plan for a 'more efficient establishment'. How this happened can only be partially explained in terms of the wartime state's impatience with volunteer inefficiency and the aristocracy's dislike of military institutions they inadequately controlled. The larger truth is that by i8o8 the volunteers were a fruit rotting on the vine, the movement insufficiently meeting the expectations and requirements contained within it, especially those of the officers. The rush of resignations, sometimes en masse and dissolving entire corps, which greeted Windham's proposals, and the readiness with which many converted to local militia were equally symptoms of the way volunteering was failing as a social activity. Behind a serious decline in numbers after I805 -conventionally written off as the effect of Trafalgar in finally securing the country against invasion -there existed a growing feeling of being engaged in a less-thansatisfying form of public service, and one even unbalancing social relationships. This dissatisfaction and unease signified, in the last analysis, the failure of local rulers, including urban notables, to achieve the control they wanted over the armed democracy created in I803 -a socially mixed, far more volatile mass movement than the volunteers of the revolutionary war had been. Volunteering neither met the military requirements of the state nor the requirements of its leading men to the degree that either wanted to save it. Such a socially extensive movement could be expected to duplicate the relationships of the social structure as a whole. Probably the greatest tension within corps was generated at that major social frontier where those with some property, capital or business, however small the amount, sought to differentiate themselves from those whom they conceived to lack any stake in society. In this respect particularly, the military hierarchy overrode the distinctions of the social hierarchy. In the volunteer rank and file, artisans and labourers, the possessing classes and the poor, rubbed shoulders indiscriminately, even the N.C.O.s being chosen for their military experience rather than for their respectability out of necessity.55 How these incongruities were managed is hard to say, no one yet having produced a sociological description of a corps. But we can claim tentatively that the I790S movement showed that volunteering was especially popular among the artisanry and that when large numbers of them took the opportunity to withdraw on the formation of the local militia, it indicated their preference for a more socially exclusive service. Other kinds of voluntary endeavour served the self-respect and pretensions of these people, identifying them with their social superiors; the voluntary society was typically engaged in work for the poor and, moreover, was organized as a 'subscriber democracy' in that the forms of election and report were observed, even though control effectively remained in the hands of high-status members.56 In the corps much the opposite was A rifle company and cavalry were to be recruited from 'persons of property'. Sheffield himself was a former army officer. Yet in little over two years the North Pevensey legion was disintegrating, if in fact it was ever serviceable. What was lacking was a sound popular base for volunteering, in spite of the efforts made to respect parochial loyalties and separate farmers from 'unsightly men'. All the indications are that this corps was ground down by the unmanageability of the rank and file, partly caused by but certainly accentuating officer problems. When the legion was finally disbanded in I 8o6, in nine out of fourteen companies the officers wanted to resign or had done so already, and no others could be found. Sheffield, after this, despaired of the volunteer system: 'a force ... wholly inadequate and inefficient, and generally undisciplined and insubordinate, and which, on the slightest dissatisfaction or caprice, might vanish in an instant'.59 Here is indicated the full dimensions of volunteer inefficiency; at bottom, indiscipline and disorganization came down to the movement's independence of established social authority. The volunteers were written off, in the last analysis, not as a ragged army but as a force wrongly constituted, having bad social effects and basically uncontrollable.
Officers found the service increasingly frustrating, caught as they were between the army's demands for efficiency and the civilian constitution of their corps. One consequence of the civilian character of volunteering was its dependence on private money. Another was that the authority of officers fell far short of what the military code would have granted them, they instead depending largely on the informal effect of their social status and personal qualities. Problems of discipline added internal inefficiencies to the structural inefficiencies of the volunteer system. Financial problems came to place the movement directly at the government's mercy. In these circumstances it was virtually impossible to preserve the great motivation behind all voluntary action in this period, the sense of performing an important public service in an area where the state could not or would not act, and doing that service usefully and well.
Many corps were living a hand-to-mouth existence from I804, when to hefty establishment costs was added the expense of extra equipment needed for permanent duty. Subscriptions brought a diminishing return, though they I803 by the threat of a compulsory levy placed on the counties, and, anyway, had few illusions about the difficulty of their task; Sheffield expected raising his corps to be the 'most disagreeable of all business'.66 Urban officers, on the other hand, modelled volunteering on the other forms of voluntary action to which they were accustomed. There are striking similarities between the corps and the voluntary societies so numerous in the towns, whether we take account of the committees and subscriptions, or the careful balance of democracy and hierarchy, or the strong and persistent localism restricting outside interference and producing low aristocratic participation. As discussed earlier, volunteering was an important social investment for urban elites as an expression of their social authority. But it had special significance for them alongside other voluntary work because it became an explicit form of national service, casting them as military leaders in the system of home defence. By giving up a purely local part in this system, however much this coincided with the government's plans, they underlined the point of their usefulness to the state but comparative insignificance within it. For these reasons they had most to lose from the failure of volunteering, and it was here that it had its greatest social effect. Many urban officers felt a strong incentive to continue their patriotic activity by joining the local militia. in particular, says a great deal about the British people's developing national consciousness, and the influence of a 'culture of patriotism' as one of the chief ways it was articulated. Never before had there been such a powerful physical manifestation of national purpose. But underneath its patriotism, volunteering was a varied and complex activity affected by social structures no less than political and military structures. The very fact that within three years of the inception of the volunteer mass an alternative system was being sought tells us that patriotism alone is an insufficient context. And when that alternative system was brought into existence it resembled a modern territorial force, resting, to a large degree, on opposite principles to the volunteers; both the state and, by implication, volunteer leaders had changed their ideas about how military patriotism could best be organized.
Ultimately, the sheer size of the volunteer mass says less about the impact of patriotic ideology than an acceptance of military service, including even extra-local service in association with the army and under army discipline, by a very large proportion of the British male population. The point is underlined by the total amount of manpower taken by the army, navy and auxiliaries during the wars, a mobilization which in population terms clearly exceeded the effort of France.68 Little compulsion was needed to achieve this level of participation. In our present state of knowledge we can only surmise that the recruitment of the armed forces was connected with the greater fluidity of Britain's social system; in particular, the absence of a sedentary peasant mass. 
